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U-La-La, What’s Happened to Our California
Right of Publicity?
Eric Farber
INTRODUCTION
In 1971, the California Legislature first enacted California Civil Code
section 3344 to protect the economic interest of celebrities by banning the
use of the name, likeness, voice and image of celebrities without authorization.1 While the statute originally gave broad protection to the rights of celebrities (as well as non-celebrities) to protect the economic interest their
fame generates, the courts have had to balance the broad rights of the statute against the interests of the First Amendment.2
As the rights granted under section 3344 cross the powerful protections of the First Amendment, California‘s courts have limited the power of
celebrities to control their own image and likeness as sometimes violative
of the First Amendment‘s protections of free speech.3
Because so many celebrities call California home, it has always been a
leading proponent of the right of publicity.4 California codified the right of
publicity through California Civil Code section 3344, as well as the postmortem right of publicity in California Civil Code section 3344.15. Although California‘s statutes are not the most liberal in their protections of
celebrity rights, they are considered strong protectors of celebrity rights.6

Eric Farber is a principal and head of Sports and Entertainment of the Pinnacle Law Group,
LLP, San Francisco, CA. In addition to a practice involving trademark, copyright and general litigation, Mr. Farber has, for the past ten years, protected the rights of publicity of the deceased hip hop artist Tupac Shakur. Mr. Shakur, one of the most famous and recognizable persons in pop culture, is
number eight for earnings on the 2007 Forbes Deceased Celebrity Earnings List. 2007 Top-Earning
Dead Celebrities, FORBES.COM, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/29/dead-celebrityearning-biz-media-deadcelebs07_cz_lg_1029celeb_land.html. Mr. Farber also represents various athletes in their day-to-day legal affairs. The author would like to recognize his friend and colleague,
James Ball for his contribution to this article, as well as a further thank you to Kulwinder Ahluwalia and
Heather Brown of the Chapman Law Review staff for their invaluable assistance.
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
2 See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001); Kirby v.
Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 608 (Ct. App. 2006).
3 See, e.g., Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 804.
4 See id. at 799–800 (discussing the protections regarding the right of publicity granted by the
California Legislature and common law).
5 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997).
6 California is one of only a handful of states that recognize the right of publicity through statute
(at last count, sixteen states have right of publicity statutes). All states recognize the common law right
of publicity. George P. Smith II, The Extent of Protection of the Individual’s Personality Against
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Cases interpreting the statute have consistently struggled to define the limits of protection.7 Even with the strong protections granted by the statute,
celebrities have had a difficult time overcoming the boundaries of the First
Amendment in controlling and protecting their persona.8
This article discusses the development of the history of the California
right of publicity statutes through the analysis of three recent California
cases. These cases—Comedy III,9 Winter,10 and Kirby11—begin to define
California courts‘ willingness to expand First Amendment protection
against California‘s statutory right of publicity. This article also discusses
the theory of transformative elements and the role of the courts as the ―trier
of fact‖ when deciding what is ―art‖ in these three landmark decisions.12
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STATUTE
Section 3344 stems from the common law right of privacy, which protects a plaintiff against appropriation of his or her name or likeness for the
defendant‘s advantage.13 Often the protection is considered to extend to
one‘s ―persona.‖14 This not only protects a person‘s name and likeness, but
also the public character or ―persona‖ they create.15 California continues to
recognize the common law right of publicity, which section 3344 codifies
and complements.16 The early language of the statute prescribed ―recovery
of damages by any living person whose name, photograph, or likeness has
been used for commercial purposes without his or her consent.‖17
It was not until 1979, in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, that the CaliforCommercial Use: Toward A New Property Right, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002). Although California
has an inherent interest because of the numbers of celebrities that reside there, other states, such as Indiana and Tennessee, have stronger statutes to protect the rights of celebrities. Alain J. Lapter, How the
Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford—A Global Perspective on the Right of
Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 264–66 (2007). Indiana‘s interest springs from the presence
of CMG Worldwide, which represents the rights to the Estates of Marilyn Monroe, James Dean, Babe
Ruth and Princess Diana, while Tennessee is home to the Estate of Elvis Presley. CMG Worldwide,
Clients, http://www.cmgww.com/clients.html.
7 See, e.g., Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 807 (―It is admittedly not a simple matter to develop a test that
will unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic expression protected by the First Amendment and
those that must give way to the right of publicity.‖).
8 See, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006).
9 Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797.
10 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
11 Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607.
12 The title of this article is in reference to the Kirby case, the most recent of the above-mentioned
cases. As I will explain below, Kieran Kirby, the former lead singer of the band Deee-Lite, used the
phrase, ―ooh-la-la‖ over and over in their most famous song, ―Groove is in the Heart.‖ Id. at 609. The
main character of Sega‘s game, Space Channel 5, was named, ―Ulala.‖ Id. at 609–10.
13 Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2008) with Eastwood v. Sup. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342,
346 (Ct. App. 1983). See also William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
14 See Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 614.
15 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001).
16 Id. at 799.
17 Id. (emphasis added). ―The statutory right originated in Civil Code section 3344, enacted in
1971, authorizing recovery of damages by any living person whose name, photograph, or likeness has
been used for commercial purposes without his or her consent.‖ Id.
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nia Supreme Court recognized a common law right of publicity.18 However, even then it was not recognized as a descendible right.19 In 1984, because neither the common law right of publicity nor section 3344 allowed
for protection of deceased celebrities‘ rights of publicity, the legislature
enacted California Civil Code section 990 (later changed to section
3344.1), which protected the descendible rights of celebrities.20
In 1984, the legislature made a significant change to 3344 and inserted
the words, ―on or in products, merchandise, or goods.‖21 The legislature
intended to expand the statute‘s protection for celebrities, but instead
created an opportunity for the courts to more fully explore the statute‘s
struggle against the First Amendment.22 The base language of the statute
now reads:
Any person who knowingly uses another‘s name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise,
goods or services, without such person‘s prior consent, or, in the case of a minor,
the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.23

The shift away from strictly advertising purposes enhances the statute‘s entanglement with the First Amendment, as commercial speech receives inherently less protection than purely political speech, artistic expression or speech that is newsworthy.24 The legislature‘s change, which was
intended to further protect celebrities from any use,25 increased the likelihood that a court would magnify the First Amendment concerns when reviewing the statute.
Under the original statute, ―for commercial purposes‖ established a
line to which courts and practitioners could separate proper from improper
appropriation of a celebrity‘s likeness. Courts have always given their
highest protections under the First Amendment to the press and newsworthy events, and less protection to commercial speech.26 For example, it was
clear that the image of a celebrity could be used in a newspaper for educational use, or even to promote a newspaper.27 However, using a celebrity‘s
image as a commercial endorsement or print ad without their authorization
603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6 (Cal. 1979).
Id. at 429.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2008); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799-800.
See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 801 (emphasis added).
See id.
23 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2008) (emphasis added).
24 See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 614 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that ―[First
Amendment] protections may extend to all forms of expression, including written and spoken words
(fact or fiction), music, films, painting, and entertainment, whether or not sold for a profit.‖).
25 See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 801.
26 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980). See
also Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between the
use of athletic statistics in news and advertizing contexts).
27 See Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
18
19
20
21
22
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was most certainly a violative use.28
The early right of publicity cases reviewed the basic threshold issues
for protection under the statute. The court did not find in favor of Joe
Montana in his case against the San Jose Mercury News for using a photograph of Montana in a poster to promote the newspaper.29 Even though the
use by the San Jose Mercury News was actually a promotional tool to increase circulation, the event depicted was newsworthy in and of itself.30 It
stands as a clear example of the overriding concern the court has for the
freedom of the press and the heightened level of protection granted to the
press. While the Ninth Circuit dismissed the statutory claims of Vanna
White when Samsung used a blond-headed robot to turn letters during a
commercial promoting one of its products, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
common law right of publicity because there was a triable issue of fact.31
In contrast to the pure commercial nature of promoting a product through
television commercials, the Montana and White cases are good examples
that the First Amendment affords protection for use of a celebrity‘s likeness
to promote a newspaper‘s archival records (newsworthy protection).
Since the initial round of cases, such as the Montana and White cases,
the courts have had to struggle with the intersection of celebrity rights and
the First Amendment in situations that are
more difficult to define.
II. SADERUP, WINTER, AND KIRBY
The first case in which the Supreme Court
of California developed the theory of ―transformative elements‖ to establish the First Amendment boundaries for the
right of publicity was Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.32 In
Comedy III, charcoal sketch artist Gary Saderup created his artistic rendering of The Three Stooges, which he then sold to the public as lithographic
T-shirts.33 Comedy III Productions, the owner of the rights of publicity of
Moe, Jerome ―Curly‖ Howard, and Larry Fein—collectively known as The
Three Stooges—sued to enjoin the sale of the lithographs and T-shirts as
well as to collect damages and attorney‘s fees.34 Saderup defended the case
to the United States Supreme Court, which denied review.35 Saderup advanced two separate defenses: (1) that his conduct did not violate the terms
of section 3341.1; and (2) that his actions were protected by the First

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

See Cher v. Forum Int‘l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982).
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 640–41.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
Id. at 800.
Id. at 800–01.
Id., cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002).
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Amendment.36 The court found neither argument persuasive.37
The court first addressed Saderup‘s argument that the use of the image
in the lithographs and on T-shirts was not within the statute.38 He contended that the statute applied only to the use of a deceased personality‘s
name, voice, photograph or image for the purpose of advertising, selling, or
soliciting the purchase of products or services.39 The court focused on the
language, ―in any manner‖ in ruling that his argument was simply ―unpersuasive.‖40 The court found that the lithographs and T-shirts themselves
were tangible personal property, which satisfied the requirements of the
statute.41 The court clarified that, while the original sketch itself was protected by the First Amendment, the lithograph copies and T-shirts were
violative.42
The second argument moved the court away from simple interpretation of the statute toward a balancing of the boundaries of the right of publicity against the protections of the First Amendment.43 Political speech,
use by the press, or artistic expression require pure or enhanced protection
by the First Amendment.44 The entanglement of the First Amendment and
celebrity rights emerges when there is a product involved.45 Although
commercial speech is not entitled to the same level of protection as pure
non-commercial speech, it is still entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment.46 The introduction of a product, such as the lithographs and
T-shirts in Comedy III, introduces the question of whether or not Saderup‘s
motives were purely for commercial gain or actually for artistic motives.47
There is no question that Saderup created a piece of artwork in the original
sketched image and, as stated earlier, the original drawing is not a violation
of the statute. The question with which the Comedy III court was faced
was whether the transfer of the sketch to the lithographs and T-shirts and
their subsequent sales violated the statute.
Section 3344.1 gives protection to original works of art.48 But what
happens when the original work is reproduced for sale without permission
of the celebrity subject for sale to the general public? To decide this, the
court developed the transformative elements test.49 The Comedy III court
stated that, in order to evoke the protection of the First Amendment, the
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 801–02.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 802–11.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. at 810.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(2) (West 2008).
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809.
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court must look to the actual creation to determine what extent the work is
―transformative.‖50 But what exactly is, ―transformative?‖ In its most explainable form, a work is transformative when it has elements the artist has
added that give ―significant expression‖ beyond the original work.51 In
these cases, the ―original work‖ is really that of the image or ―likeness of
the celebrity.‖52 The Comedy III court refused First Amendment protection.53
Saderup failed to create a work that was uniquely his. His reproductions were nothing more than a literal rendering of the Three Stooges in
charcoal.54 The California Supreme Court said that the literal rendering
failed to have any transformative elements from the original image of the
celebrity and, without that, the First Amendment defense simply does not
apply.55 Saderup simply did not do enough to add his own artistic vision to
the drawing of the Three Stooges.
Many artists, especially those out of the sixties‘ pop art movement,
used celebrities as the subject of their art. Andy
Warhol‘s portraits of Marilyn Monroe, Chairman
Mao, and James Dean are examples of popular
culture lending itself to art.56 Certainly, Warhol
(or his estate) can sell recreations of ―Marilyn‖
without having to pay royalties or even get permission from Marilyn Monroe‘s estate. The
age of Marilyn has enough transformative qualities to it that it is known as an important work by
Warhol and famous as a Warhol work, rather than simply as an image of
Marilyn Monroe.57 Although there is little doubt that Warhol‘s intent was
not only to create art but to earn money, it does not appear that his immediate goal was to put the paintings on T-shirts for sale.
Although Warhol is an excellent example of a famous artist, a less
famous artist is not left out of the analysis under Comedy III, requiring only
transformative elements to relieve an artist from the grasp of the celebrity‘s
rights.58 However, a jury of twelve could have ruled differently. The California Supreme Court, by reviewing the case without remand, acted as the
curator of the museum to decide whether or not there was a significant
enough transformation to give Saderup‘s work First Amendment protection
Id.
Id. at 808.
52 Id. at 809.
53 Id. at 810.
54 Id. at 801.
55 Id. at 811.
56 Zeke Quezada, Press Release, About.com, Andy Warhol: The Celebrity Portraits, http://
govegas.about.com/cs/familyfun/a/warhol.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Celebrity Portraits].
57 Id.
58 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808.
50
51
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as a serious work of art. It is this author‘s opinion that, although the ―art‖
that Saderup created was woefully short of transformative elements, his
clear intention to simply sell T-shirts should have played a more pivotal
role in the court‘s analysis. If Saderup had created a one of a kind drawing,
which then hung on a museum wall for a number of years and achieved its
own fame as a work of art, it is extremely unlikely that the court would
have reached the same conclusion.
Although the right of publicity won the battle against the First
Amendment in Comedy III, the California Supreme Court‘s transformative
elements test set the stage for a First Amendment takeover. The case of
Winter v. DC Comics was the first to truly interpret the rule developed by
the Comedy III court.59 In Winter, the Winter brothers, Johnny and Edgar,
a long-time singing duo with distinct long white
hair and extremely fair skin, sued DC Comics for
the publication of Jonah Hex.60 Jonah Hex was a
five volume comic series featuring the Autumn
Brothers, a pair of half snake, half human killers
named Johnny and Edgar.61 Both carried weapons—one a pistol, the other a rifle—and were evil
characters.62
Fig. 1 The Autumn Brothers of Jonah Hex

Fig. 2 Johnny Winter

59
60
61
62

69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003).
Id. at 476.
Id.
Id.

Fig. 3 Edgar Winter
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The Winter brothers sued DC Comics for misappropriation of their
right of publicity for basing the Autumn Brothers characters on them.63 DC
Comics defended on First Amendment grounds and won summary judgment in the trial court.64 The court of appeal originally affirmed the trial
court‘s grant of summary judgment for DC Comics, but, on instruction
from the California Supreme Court, reversed its decision and remanded,
stating that there were triable issues of fact which existed with regard to
California Civil Code section 3344.65 Interestingly, Winter‘s first visit to
the supreme court was delayed because of the Comedy III decision, which
the court decided first.66
In the second round, the court of appeal affirmed summary judgment
on all counts except misappropriation under California Civil Code section
3344 and remanded the case to the trial court.67 DC Comics petitioned the
California Supreme Court to review the matter again for determination that
the use, as a matter of law, was not a misappropriation of the Winters‘ likenesses.68
The supreme court, in its first right of publicity decision since Comedy
III, granted review.69 The court specifically addressed the economic issue
inherent in section 3344, stating that the rights conveyed by the statute are
economic.70 Addressing the issue much like claims under the Lanham
Act,71 the court looked at the monopolization of the celebrity‘s likeness by
the owner.72 The celebrity can still ―monopolize the production of conventional, more or less fungible, images of the celebrity‖ with regards to memorabilia.73 However, when the creation contains ―significant transformative elements‖ that remove it from the general economic crossover that may
be found in celebrity memorabilia, the defendant is entitled to First
Amendment protection because it is less likely to interfere with the economic interests that the statute is designed to protect.74 The court posed the
question of whether or not the DC Comics creation of Jonah Hex was
something with which the Winter brothers should be economically concerned.75
The obvious challenge that courts must face is to define, ―significant
transformative elements.‖ In doing so, Winter looked to the language of

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. The Winter Brothers also filed suit for defamation, which is not discussed here. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 477–78.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2000).
Winter, 69 P.3d at 477–78.
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id. at 478.
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Comedy III: ―[E]xpression of something other than the likeness of the celebrity . . . .‖76 and ―[a]n artist depicting a celebrity must contribute something more than a ‗merely trivial‘ variation, but must create something recognizably ‗his own‘ in order to qualify for legal protection.‖77 The court
continued: ―[W]hen an artist‘s skill and talent is manifestly subordinated to
the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to
commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist‘s right of free expression is outweighed by the right of publicity.‖78 The court continued to explore the transformative elements added by the artist, whether or not the
work was worthy of First Amendment protections due to the artist‘s contribution to the celebrity‘s likeness, and to what extent the new work‘s economic interest is furthered by the involvement of the celebrity.79
The supreme court held in favor of DC Comics, determining that the
economic interests of the Winter Brothers were not infringed when
weighed against the interests of the First Amendment.80 The court suggested that the use by DC Comics was not one with which the Winter
brothers should be concerned, because the brothers were a singing duo who
likely would not have an economic interest in a comic book and whose particular fans do not really care about them in cartoon form.81
However, as further discussed below, the court should not simply be
looking at whether or not the fans should care, as the publicity right is, and
should be, based on the origination of the likeness. The Winter brothers
should be allowed to control their likeness and decide where, when, and
how it can be used. Where it came from, how it was imagined and who
should control that use is a key pillar of the right of publicity that the courts
are now retreating from in the face of the First Amendment.
The court addressed this case using the First Amendment argument
based on the transformative nature of the work.82 And, in this instance, the
court, stepping in as the trier of fact, concluded that the work was entitled
to First Amendment protection.83 The court could have put before the jury
the questions: (1) whether the work was a transformative use of the Winters‘ images; and (2) whether the intent of DC Comics was to merely capitalize on the fame and persona of the Winter brothers as a vehicle to draw
prospective readers. Looking to commercial intent, in addition to the transformative elements, creates a more complete analysis to decide the question
of whether or not there is an economic misappropriation. The issue of
whether or not this infringed on the economic interests could have been put

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)).
Id. (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797).
Id. (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797).
Id.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id.
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to a jury. In this author‘s opinion, the court was not incorrect in its finding
because of the significant level of transformative elements; however, in
cases that are less certain, the court‘s ruling as a matter of law causes strain
on the transformative elements test.
In Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., a California appellate court was
called on to review another case involving transformative elements.84 Kierin Kirby was the lead singer of the early 1990‘s band, Deee-Lite.85 She
performed as lead of the band with great devotion as a character she developed, ―Lady Miss Kier.‖86 Kirby‘s celebrity and public persona was based
more on her fame from Deee-Lite and as Lady Miss Kier than anything
else.87 Lady Miss Kier had a distinctive style that Kirby is still known for
today, combining retro and futuristic looks with signature
platform shoes, knee-socks,
unitards, short pleated skirts
(generally plaid), and sporting
a bare midriff and backpack.88
Kirby also claims the lyrical
expression ―ooh-la-la‖, which
she sings in Deee-Lite‘s most
popular song, ―Groove is in
the Heart.‖89 Although Kirby
had not put out an album, with
or without Deee-Lite, in many
years, she maintained a distinct following for Lady Miss
Kier.90
Enter Sega.91 Sometime
between 1997 and 1999 an
employee from Sega Japan created Space Channel 5, a video game targeted
to teenage girls.92 Space Channel 5‘s main character was Ulala, a female
reporter who is dispatched to investigate aliens who are invading Earth by
causing uncontrollable dancing.93 Ulala was outfitted with several different
costumes throughout the game, but was primarily seen in a miniskirt, elbow-length gloves, stiletto-healed knee-high platform boots and hot pink
50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006)
Id. at 609.
Id.
87 See id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Sega was not the only defendant in the case. Id. at 611. THQ and AGETEC were also defendant parties. Id. THQ as a licensee for the handheld version of the game for Nintendo and AGETEC
for their license to distribute for the Playstation platform. Id. at 610.
92 Id. at 609.
93 Id. at 610.
84
85
86
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hair tied in two dramatic ponytails.94
After Sega had released the game in several formats, Sega contemplated using the Deee-Lite song, ―Groove is in the Heart‖ to promote the
game. They even contacted Kirby to see if she, as Lady Miss Kier, would
promote the game.95 She refused and, in 2003, sued Sega for infringement
of the common law right of publicity, violation of California Civil Code
section 3344, violation of the Lanham Act, unfair competition and interference with prospective economic advantage.96
Sega moved the court for summary judgment on two grounds. First,
Sega argued that Kirby failed to meet all of the elements required for her
claims.97 Additionally, Sega asserted that the First Amendment was a
complete defense to the action.98 Under the appellate court‘s analysis, it is
apparent that the first part of Sega‘s defense was simply not necessary.
The trial court had found that material factual issues existed as to whether
Sega had misappropriated Kirby‘s likeness by their creation of the Ulala
character, and the appellate court agreed.99 There were material issues of
fact whether Ulala was based on Kirby under both common law and statute.100 However, the court stated that it was unnecessary to carry the analysis that far, as the First Amendment was a complete defense to Kirby‘s
claims.101
The court, immediately citing Comedy III and Winter, looked to the
transformative elements and inquired whether ―the defendant‘s work ‗adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message.‘‖102 The court further
stated that the transformative nature of the work would make it ―less likely
to interfere with the economic interests protected by the right of publicity.‖103 The court, in reaching its decision, did not give any weight to the
fact that Sega approached Kirby to endorse the game prior to its release.104
As such, the court completely ignored Sega‘s commercial intent when
creating the Ulala character.
Kirby insisted that the Ulala character was, indeed, her, simply with
―digital enhancements and manipulations.‖105 The court did not agree with
this argument and felt that Kirby and the Ulala character, although they
shared similarities, had sufficiently different hairstyles, clothing, look, and
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id. at 615 (citations omitted).
Id.
See id. at 615–18.
Id.
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even dance moves.106 The court, despite Kirby‘s insistence, refused to reject the transformative elements test and reaffirmed Comedy III‘s analysis.107 Although it certainly could be argued that Kirby based her own character, Lady Miss Kier on Japanese anime style and is, therefore, not
entitled to any protection because it was not developed by her, the character
that she developed is clearly entitled to protection under both the common
law and statutory right of publicity, at least to some extent. The court did
address the similarities between Lady Miss Kier and Ulala and dismissed
them by simply stating that, although there were some similarities, Sega‘s
actions were protected by the First Amendment due to the transformative
elements that were present.108
Should jurists really be determining what is ―art‖? None of the three
cases discussed here, although stating that the transformative elements test
is a factual question, actually allowed a jury—or even a trial court judge—
to make the determination, as each was decided by a panel.109 The Kirby
court‘s application of the transformative elements test, which left out the
actual balance in the economic interest as enunciated in Comedy III, may
have led to an inconsistent result. It is unknown whether a jury would have
decided the fate of Lady Miss Kier the same as the appellate court panel.110
CONCLUSION
The rulings from the above three cases are interesting from more than
simply a legal perspective. The rulings affect our popular culture and the
money derived from our popular culture. The rights protected by section
3344 are, as defined by the courts, economic rights and the right to control
the economic aspects of a celebrity‘s persona and the economic interest the
celebrity built in to that persona.111 According to the courts, a bit of tweaking here and there to the image or likeness or the name may allow an ―unauthorized‖ artist to capitalize on that persona.112 Without something more,
the transformative elements test is incomplete. The court must also look to
the commercial intent of the defendant. If we look at the facts of the three
cases on a use scale that combines the transformative elements, as well as
the commercial nature or intent of the defendant, the court could give better
direction as to what is violative of the First Amendment. Comedy III was
essentially a direct copy of a basic image of the Three Stooges and con-

Id. at 615–17.
Id. at 616–18.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 608; Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001).
110 One can judge for oneself. A montage of Lady Miss Kier and Ulala has been assembled on
YouTube. Who Came First—Ulala or Lady Kier?, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pyI75Wd8ug
(last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
111 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2008).
112 Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 615.
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verted into a charcoal drawing for the specific intent of selling T-shirts.113
This is a clear violation of the economic interest of the celebrity. There is
little question that this level of use should be stopped. On the other end of
the scale is the Winter case, where the use has little intent and is highly
transformative. The characters developed by DC Comics had little, if anything, to do with the Winter brothers, other than some basic level of inspiration as to their overall look of the caricature.114 There was little to do
with the public persona that Winter brothers had established. Further, the
creation of a comic book, which many consider art in a form similar to
movies or television, would be entitled to a higher level of protection.
Combining the two analyses would give a more defined result.
Carefully viewing the commercial intent could lead to a different conclusion in Kirby. Keiran Kirby (or, as she was better known to the public,
Lady Miss Kier) was clearly more than simple inspiration for the Ulala
character in the Sega video game. Her hair, clothes, backpack, and overall
style were almost identical to the video game character. Further, Sega went
so far as to contact her to promote the game.115 Sega‘s intent could be
looked at as attempting to further connect the two characters. Despite these
obvious connections, the obvious inspiration, and the clear recognition of
the character to Lady Miss Kier to the Sega character, the court blocked her
attempt at the misappropriation claim by simply stating that the elements to
the character were transformed enough to be protected by the First
Amendment—without having a jury make that decision.116 Sega‘s commercial intent is slightly less clear. We know that Sega attempted to have
Kirby and her band‘s song to promote the game.117 The persona that Sega
used could be argued to be for the purpose of selling more video games. A
jury balancing these elements together could clearly render a different result.
Paying attention to the commercial nature in addition to the ―transformative use‖ certainly assists the trier of fact in its determination. What
is the actual difference between White and Kirby? In White, White‘s persona was transformed into a robot that turned letters on a board, an action
that was very similar to her day job.118 The robot was specifically used to
sell through a television commercial.119 In Kirby, the use was a video
game. Ulala was arguably based on Kirby to attract the specific demographic to which Kirby appealed. Therefore, Sega used the persona to capitalize on the demographic and fan base that Kirby built, thus heightening
the commercial nature of their use. Leaving out the commercial nature of
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Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797.
Winter, 69 P.3d 473.
Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 610.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 613.
White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992)
Id.
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the analysis can severely damage the rights the statutes are designed to protect. The Winter court did address the economic right but quickly dismissed the Winter brothers‘ claim that DC Comics had impaired such right
by stating that transformative works, especially those that are worthy of
First Amendment protection, are less likely to interfere with the economic
interest protected by the right of publicity.120 Further, the court asserted
that the statute‘s purpose is to protect the celebrity‘s economic right, i.e.,
the right to distribute its own memorabilia.121 This approach leaves out
what celebrity has truly become to our pop culture.
America has been dominating the market on celebrity culture since before the first frame of film was shot in Hollywoodland in the late 1800‘s.
Through the 1800‘s, showman wrestlers, circus performers, and boxers
were known wherever there were newspapers—not just in America, but
worldwide. Certainly, P.T. Barnham was one of the first to control the
economic right and capitalize on the fame of a celebrity.
Just as the world focuses our collective attention on the celebrity, the
celebrity focuses its attention on trying to exploit and monetize it—as is its
right. The right of the celebrity to control its economic rights is bounded
only by the tenets of the First Amendment.122 As the Kirby case shows us,
Sega, with a far greater ability to reach millions of people than Lady Miss
Keir ever could, has stumbled onto a new outlet for exploiting the fame of a
celebrity apart from the celebrity‘s own rights. Just as Sega developed a
game—arguably based on the persona of Lady Miss Kier—one can imagine a game based on two debutante sisters, both tall, thin and attractive,
who have to save the world by attending parties and driving in convertible
Bentleys. One could also imagine a game based on an Austrian bodybuilder who must build an empire on his way to becoming a top politician. In
recognition of the recent decisions and the light standard that the court has
now set to earn First Amendment protection, creators and artists could
create characters truly based on celebrities without their permission or authorization as long as it is transformed enough from the literal image of the
celebrity.
Allowing First Amendment protection based solely on considerations
of transformative elements, without recognition of commercial intent, circumvents too much of the statute‘s protections. As discussed above, Andy
Warhol often used celebrities as the subject of his work.123 However, Warhol‘s dominant motive was not simply to sell T-shirts or lithographs or video games bearing his creation. His dominant motive was to actually create
120 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003) (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)).
121 Id.
122 Id. (―We noted that the right of publicity threatens two purposes of the First Amendment: (1)
preserving an uninhibited marketplace of ideas; and (2) furthering the individual right of selfexpression.‖).
123 See Celebrity Portraits, supra note 56.
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a work of art. Warhol uses celebrities as the focus of his work to show us
just how celebrity-driven our culture is. However, regardless of the motive, his works became known more as the work of Warhol than the celebrities they depicted. They were not literal depictions and certainly had
―transformative elements,‖ but in many cases there was little difference between the work he created and a literal image of the celebrity. The Marilyn
Monroe painting is a good example of this. There is no question that the
painted image is simply Marilyn in a distorted color pattern. However, the
painting became known as an artistic work by Warhol, rather than simply
an image of Marilyn.
Even if the painting was by a different artist, as long as the artist‘s
rendition becomes known for its own merit apart from the celebrity it no
longer infringes on the celebrity‘s economic interests. A Warhol effect, so
to speak. If Saderup‘s sketch of the Three Stooges had become famous on
its own, it would be difficult for the court to stop Saderup‘s commercialization of the sketch.
The Winter court discussed the Winter brothers‘ lack of exploitation in
the comic book market.124 However, as our culture has an ever-growing
fascination with ―celebrity,‖ and with the amazing avenues a celebrity and
its team of advisors can use to exploit its fame, celebrities should have the
right to pursue any and all avenues. The right of publicity should protect
all avenues for the celebrity, whether a particular judge believes they can
be exploited or not. Clothing lines, bottled waters, luggage lines, sunglasses, sunscreens . . . how about a line of Nicole Ritchie baby care books
. . . or Brett Favre hand warmers . . . are all commercial and are more obvious economic interests. It is not hard to imagine a comic book series
starring Jessica Simpson and her boyfriend-of-the-moment. Should she not
have the right to exploit that economic interest?
The courts‘ failure to look beyond the sketch, the image, or the digitized version is likely to further the misuse of celebrity name and likeness.
Courts should instead look to the dominant motive and the strength of the
artwork itself, and the notoriety it has gained on its own.
It is unlikely that we will see legions of unauthorized Arnold Schwarzenegger copies in digitized form for a video game without his name or
voice, which would be protected under the statute. If the theory of transformative elements is followed, however, without consideration of the
commercial intent, commercialization of celebrities‘ images, without authorization for a myriad of uses, will continue to be viable. A court must
also take into consideration the intent of the defendant along with the transformative elements to form a more complete test to protect both the right of
publicity and First Amendment guarantees.

124

Winter, 69 P.3d 473.
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